



Capabilities-Based Approach – Implications for STRATCOM

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Changing Strategic Environment



- **External environment**
 - Global war on terrorism
 - Asymmetry of both stakes and capabilities in regional conflicts
 - More WMD-armed adversaries
 - Implications on use of capabilities – kinetic, non-kinetic, nuclear, non-nuclear - perceptions of friends and foes alike
- **Internal (DoD) environment**
 - Multiple defense policy goals (assure, dissuade, deter, defeat)
 - Role of uncertainty in defense planning – how to hedge?
 - Need for greater interagency coordination
 - Strategic communications as part of coordinated national effort
 - Changing roles for “traditional” military capabilities

Evolution of STRATCOM



- **Strategic (Nuclear)**
 - Strategic Air Command (1946-1992)
 - JSTPS (1960-1992)
 - Original USSTRATCOM (1992-2002)
- **Space**
 - Service space activities
 - USSPACECOM (1985-2002)
- **Fundamental changes lead to new organizations**
 - 9/11, WMD proliferation, rise of rogue states/non-state actors
 - Global capabilities, global effects, global audiences
 - USSPACECOM/USSTRATCOM disestablished on 1 Oct 02
 - New USSTRATCOM stood up on 1 Oct 02
 - Unified Command Plan Change 2 assigned four additional missions in January 2003 -- Global Strike, Integrated Missile Defense, DOD Information Operations, and C4ISR



STRATCOM Mission Statement




“Establish and provide full-spectrum global strike, coordinated space and information operations capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security objectives. Provide operational space support, integrated missile defense, global C4ISR, and specialized planning expertise to the joint warfighter.”

Global Capabilities for Deterrence and Warfighting

Deterrence – Old View



- **Deterrence**-The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02 definition)



The New Deterrence Challenge



NPR

Changing Deterrence Dynamics

- From “Central Deterrence” to WMD-armed regional adversaries who are multiple, diverse, and less well-understood, and who may be willing to run high risks and absorb high costs
- Capabilities built around a New Triad

QDR

Capabilities-Based Planning

- From optimizing for conflict in two specific regions to building a portfolio of capabilities robust across a spectrum of possible contingencies
- Capabilities to deter and defeat adversaries relying on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare


*How to conduct capabilities-based planning
for strategic deterrence?*

Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs)



Initial Joint Operating Concepts

- Major Combat Ops - JFCOM
- Stability Ops - JFCOM
- Homeland Security - NORTHCOM
- Strategic Deterrence - STRATCOM



Available at www.dtic.mil/jointvision

In Final DoD coordination—with SECDEF



Strategic Deterrence – New View



Strategic Deterrence--The prevention of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.

- **Enduring vital interests include:**
 - **Maintaining the integrity of U.S. territory**
 - **Preventing mass casualties at home and abroad**
 - **Protecting critical U.S. and international infrastructures (energy, telecommunications, water, essential services, etc.) that support our basic standard of living and economic viability**
 - **Promoting democracy and free trade, and supporting the defense of U.S. allies**




Adversary Decision Calculus



Cost Imposition

Benefit Denial



Deterrence Strategy

Successful deterrence is maintained by balancing an adversary's perceived benefits with credible costs or by denying the adversary benefits that may have been gained. The U.S. can also induce adversary restraint by taking actions to 'shift the fulcrum'.

Deterrence Capabilities vs. STRATCOM Missions



Capabilities specified in Strategic Deterrence JOC

STRATCOM UCP Assigned Missions

Enabling Means

- Global Situational Awareness
- Command and Control
- Overseas Presence
- Allied/Coalition Military Cooperation & Integration

Direct Means

- Force Projection
- Nuclear Strike Capabilities
- Active and Passive Defenses
- Global Strike
- Strategic Deterrence Information Operations
- Inducement Operations
- Space Control

- Strategic Nuclear Deterrence
- Global Strike
- Space Operations
- Global Ballistic Missile Defense
- C4
- ISR
- Information Operations

Global Capabilities supporting both Regional Combatant Commanders and National Leadership

Some thoughts about capabilities*



- We are in a highly dynamic environment
- It is not adequate to design forces and strategies on the assumption that adversaries will remain unchanged
- Capabilities should be designed with the question of how adversaries might foil them in mind
- It is valuable to develop combinations of capabilities that reduce adversaries' abilities to defeat any single U.S. capability
- Asymmetric responses are most likely—"typical" arms race dynamics (tit-for-tat) are less plausible
- Our forces must be flexible enough so they will not be badly degraded by changes that adversaries may institute as a result of U.S. activities

*Prof. Robert Jervis, Columbia Univ.

Why Prioritizing Required Capabilities is Difficult



- Inherent limitations in a capabilities based approach
 - Weighting scenarios based on perceived likelihood seen as inconsistent with emphasis on uncertainty
 - Emphasis is on *satisficing* across potential threats and conditions
 - not optimizing against specific, well-defined threats
 - “Required capabilities” is the full range of things needed to meet the challenges identified

Analytic Approach



Deriving Required Capabilities

Review 2020 Threat Trends

key trends & capabilities of interest

Identify Range of 2020 Conflict Scenarios (47)

"Scenario Generator"

Develop Set of Spanning Scenarios (10)

detailed

Conduct Deterrence Assessment of Spanning Set

define deterrence challenges

Identify Required Capabilities for Deterrence

across scenarios & challenges

Assessing Required Capabilities

Review Planned Force Capabilities




**Identify Shortfalls/
Areas for
Capability Enhancement**


Identify Industrial Base Issues


Provide Insights and Recommendations


“Scenario Generator”

- Adversary Type
- Leadership Structure
- Situational Awareness
- Risk-taking Propensity
- Adversary Strategic Goals
- Adversary Stakes
- Adversary Operational Goals



- 
- Nuclear
 - Biological
 - Chemical
 - Space
 - et al

- 
- Air/missile defense
 - Target Hardening
 - Mobility/CCD
 - Network protection
 - et al


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- Geographic
 - Coalition
 - Access
 - Warning
 - et al

Strategic Deterrence Assessment Lab (SDAL)



The Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept (SD JOC), Feb 2004 (Final Draft), establishes the requirement for the SDAL:

“Effective implementation of this approach to metrics and experimentation will require a dedicated, long-term assessment effort. Establishment of a ‘Strategic Deterrence Assessment Lab’ would focus DoD activities and create a national asset for strategic deterrence effectiveness assessment. This would aid in the continued development of strategic deterrence joint operating concepts and strategies. The results of these assessments would be folded into JFC deliberate planning and support rapid development of suggested courses of action in crisis action planning.”



- **Establish dedicated, long-term capability with a national focus to:**
 - **Aid deliberate planning**
 - **Support rapid COA development in crisis planning**
 - **Aid concept and strategy development**

An Assessment Process



Step 1: Assess Adversary Decision Calculus

- Develop adversary strategic profile.
 - Identify and evaluate adversary perceptions of:
 - Costs
 - Benefits
 - Consequences of Restraint
- ...of a particular COA.
- Identify critical factors that influence adversary perception.
 - Identify key uncertainties



Vet results with Intel Community.



Step 2: Develop and Assess U.S. Deterrent Actions

- Identify high-leverage actions.
- Assess intended and unintended deterrent effects.
- Prioritize potential U.S. actions
- Identify required capabilities.



Incorporate results into plan/action.



Feedback



Summary



- **STRATCOM is a global combatant command with multiple, complementary mission areas**
- **STRATCOM has both warfighting and deterrence responsibilities**
- **Current STRATCOM portfolio serves as a “hedge” against uncertainty**
- **STRATCOM must provide the best military capabilities—today and tomorrow—for both national leadership and regional commanders**



Questions?



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